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Embracing the fog of war [electronic resource] : assessment and metrics in counterinsurgency / Ben Connable.

Summary:

Campaign assessments help decisionmakers in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process -- contextual assessment -- that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders. Since this manuscript was completed in mid-2011, various elements of DoD have published new doctrine on assessment, some of which addresses criticisms raised in this report. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has also revamped its assessment process.

Electronic resources

Record details

  • Physical Description: 1 online resource (xxxi, 308 pages) : color illustrations, maps
  • Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2012.

Content descriptions

General Note:
"National Defense Research Institute."
"Prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense."
Bibliography, etc. Note:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 289-308).
Formatted Contents Note:
Introduction -- Concepts that shape counterinsurgency assessment -- Centralized assessment theory and pattern and trend analysis -- The effects-based approach to assessment -- Choosing core metrics -- Vietnam-era assessment -- Assessment in Afghanistan -- Why does centralized assessment fail in counterinsurgency? -- Conclusions, recommendations, and options -- A proposed alternative to centralized assessment.
Language Note:
English.
Source of Description Note:
Print version record.
Subject:
Counterinsurgency > Evaluation.

Accessibility Features

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1001 . ‡aConnable, Ben, ‡eauthor.
24510. ‡aEmbracing the fog of war ‡h[electronic resource] : ‡bassessment and metrics in counterinsurgency / ‡cBen Connable.
264 1. ‡aSanta Monica, CA : ‡bRAND, ‡c2012.
300 . ‡a1 online resource (xxxi, 308 pages) : ‡bcolor illustrations, maps
336 . ‡atext ‡btxt ‡2rdacontent
337 . ‡acomputer ‡bc ‡2rdamedia
338 . ‡aonline resource ‡bcr ‡2rdacarrier
347 . ‡atext file ‡bPDF ‡2rda
4901 . ‡aRand Corporation monograph series
500 . ‡a"National Defense Research Institute."
500 . ‡a"Prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense."
504 . ‡aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 289-308).
5050 . ‡aIntroduction -- Concepts that shape counterinsurgency assessment -- Centralized assessment theory and pattern and trend analysis -- The effects-based approach to assessment -- Choosing core metrics -- Vietnam-era assessment -- Assessment in Afghanistan -- Why does centralized assessment fail in counterinsurgency? -- Conclusions, recommendations, and options -- A proposed alternative to centralized assessment.
520 . ‡aCampaign assessments help decisionmakers in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and the executive branch shape what tend to be difficult and lengthy counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Assessment informs critical decisions, including the allocation of resources and major shifts in strategy. The complex and chaotic environment of the typical COIN campaign presents vexing challenges to assessment, and efforts to overcome these challenges are mired in an overreliance on aggregated quantitative data that are often inaccurate and misleading. This comprehensive examination of COIN assessment as practiced through early 2011, as described in the literature and doctrine, and as applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps in this centralized, quantitative approach. The author proposes an alternative process -- contextual assessment -- that accounts for the realities of the COIN environment and the needs of both policymakers and commanders. Since this manuscript was completed in mid-2011, various elements of DoD have published new doctrine on assessment, some of which addresses criticisms raised in this report. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has also revamped its assessment process.
546 . ‡aEnglish.
5880 . ‡aPrint version record.
650 0. ‡aCounterinsurgency ‡xEvaluation.
7102 . ‡aNational Defense Research Institute (U.S.)
7102 . ‡aRand Corporation. ‡0(CARDINAL)137141
830 0. ‡aRand Corporation monograph series.
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