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Venezuela as an exporter of 4th generation warfare instability [electronic resource] / Max G. Manwaring.

Summary:

Almost no one seems to understand the Marxist-Leninist foundations of Hugo Chavez's political thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general vision of his "Bolivarian Revolution." The abbreviated concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S. dominated) political and economic systems in the Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and "popular" (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any bourgeois opposition, Chavez's revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional military war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a "new society" will only be created by a gradual, systematic, compulsory application of agitation and propaganda (i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion in favor of a "revolution" and against the bourgeois system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that the North American (U.S.) "Empire" and its bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not doing what is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will. This may not be a traditional national security problem for the United States and other targeted countries, and it may not be perceived to be as lethal as conventional conflict, but that does not diminish the cruel reality of compulsion.

Electronic resources

Record details

  • Physical Description: 1 online resource (xi, 46 pages).
  • Publisher: Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012.

Content descriptions

General Note:
"December 2012."
Title from title screen (viewed on December 21, 2012).
Bibliography, etc. Note:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 38-46).
Formatted Contents Note:
Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian vision and how to achieve it -- Key components of the Chavez strategic-level asymmetric warfare -- The paramilitary operational model -- Implications and recommendations.
Reproduction Note:
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified]: HathiTrust Digital Library. 2025.
System Details Note:
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
Subject:
Chávez Frías, Hugo > Political and social views.
Asymmetric warfare > Venezuela.
Propaganda > Venezuela.
Paramilitary forces > Venezuela.
Political stability > Venezuela.
Venezuela > Politics and government.
Venezuela > Foreign relations.
Venezuela > Military policy.
Available in another form: (OCoLC)823518509
Venezuela as an exporter of 4th generation warfare instability Venezuela as an exporter of 4th generation warfare instability

Accessibility Features

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5050 . ‡aHugo Chavez's Bolivarian vision and how to achieve it -- Key components of the Chavez strategic-level asymmetric warfare -- The paramilitary operational model -- Implications and recommendations.
520 . ‡aAlmost no one seems to understand the Marxist-Leninist foundations of Hugo Chavez's political thought. It becomes evident, however, in the general vision of his "Bolivarian Revolution." The abbreviated concept is to destroy the old foreign-dominated (U.S. dominated) political and economic systems in the Americas, to take power, and to create a socialist, nationalistic, and "popular" (direct) democracy in Venezuela that would sooner or later extend throughout the Western Hemisphere. Despite the fact that the notion of the use of force (compulsion) is never completely separated from the Leninist concept of destroying any bourgeois opposition, Chavez's revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional military war of maneuver and attrition, or a traditional insurgency. According to Lenin and Chavez, a "new society" will only be created by a gradual, systematic, compulsory application of agitation and propaganda (i.e., agit-prop). That long-term effort is aimed at exporting instability and generating public opinion in favor of a "revolution" and against the bourgeois system. Thus, the contemporary asymmetric revolutionary warfare challenge is rooted in the concept that the North American (U.S.) "Empire" and its bourgeois political friends in Latin America are not doing what is right for the people, and that the socialist Bolivarian philosophy and leadership will. This may not be a traditional national security problem for the United States and other targeted countries, and it may not be perceived to be as lethal as conventional conflict, but that does not diminish the cruel reality of compulsion.
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651 0. ‡aVenezuela ‡xForeign relations. ‡0(CARDINAL)297442
651 0. ‡aVenezuela ‡xMilitary policy.
7102 . ‡aArmy War College (U.S.). ‡bStrategic Studies Institute. ‡0(CARDINAL)155441
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